Abstract. -This study examines the development of Lucas Alamán's conservative ideology during Mexico's early republic. The article demonstrates how his belief in tradition, Spanish heritage, monarchy, a central state, a strong Church, and military-backed elite rule evolved. Particularly compelling is how Alamán's fears concerning US expansionism and the experience of the US occupation in the wake of the war of 1846-1848 forged his thinking. Alamán's warnings and his analysis of the US-Mexican relations were fairly accurate -in an almost prophetic way. It is through this confrontation with the northern neighbor that one can understand Alamán's nationalist agenda.
friendships with US army officers. Thus, the tendency to collaborate despite the desire for victory emerges as one of the reasons why Mexico's leaders failed to mobilize the country when the US invasion began. Alamán, however, described more truthfully than many of his contemporaries the shortcomings of Mexican institutions and society. If only for that reason, Alamán's insights into the war merit special attention.
Alamán enjoyed a good education and demonstrated a cosmopolitan outlook. After attending an amiga nursing school in Guanajuato during the 1790s, he became involved in his family's mining business. Afterwards, he studied at the Real Seminario de Minería in Mexico City. In 1814 Alamán traveled to Spain and began touring other European nations shortly thereafter, studying German mining techniques as well as chemistry in Paris. Upon his return to Mexico, the viceroy appointed him to direct the health services provided by the Junta de Sanidad. As the Marquis of San Clemente, Alamán undoubtedly dreamed of becoming a minister in the court of a Mexican Bourbon monarch. 2 The independence of Mexico from Spain in 1821 did not modify Alamán's European, traditional views. Conservatives argued for a centralized state, a strong national army, defense of the Church, tariff protection, and that the United States could not be trusted. At the beginning of the independence insurgency, in 1810, the violence of Miguel Hidalgo's followers horrified Alamán when the insurrectionaries slaughtered virtually all of the Spanish residents in his native Guanajuato. Contrary to the general trend among participants as well as future scholars, Alamán pointedly called attention to indigenous participation in the insurrection. Unlike most criollos, however, Alamán yearned for home rule. Elected as a deputy to the Spanish Parliament in Cádiz, Alamán argued eloquently for Mexican autonomy. Although the Spanish deputies had little sympathy for Mexico ending colonial rule, they approved without discussion Alamán's proposal for reforming mining procedures. Alamán also began to call for a Spanish prince to rule over a Mexican kingdom. One month later, when Augustín de Iturbide, a criollo general serving the Royalists, called for independence by means of a Catholic monarchy with equality for all citizens, Iturbide won everyone over and became Mexico's first ruler in the form of a monarch. But because he quarreled with the new congress and failed to gain the support of regional leaders, Iturbide had to resign in February 1823, only ten months after becoming emperor. Alamán traveled to Britain and France to organize his own mining company before returning to Mexico in March 1823.
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A centralist who opposed federalism strongly, Alamán's political philosophy would always be conservative. A practical ideologue, Alamán felt that no precedent existed for a republican system to succeed in Mexico. Alamán had read Edmund Burke carefully and agreed with the British theorist that tradition and custom were the hallmarks of any society. The liberals sought to legislate civil liberties while eliminating privileges which the army, Church, university, and Indians had enjoyed in the past. Alamán believed that Mexico had followed liberal ideologues blindly and had established a system with no roots within the Hispanic past. Salvation, he believed, lay in the revival of colonial institutions and respect for the Spanish heritage of religion, authority, and property. Alamán insisted that political institutions must conform to socioeconomic reality. 4 As minister of state and foreign relations in the first republican government from 1823 to 1825, Alamán realized that US expansionism threatened Mexican stability and territorial integrity. US expansionism began with attacks upon Native Americans by settlers in the English colonies. Warfare with several European powers during the colonial era continued after the founding of the nation. There was aggression against the Spanish in Florida as well as an unsuccessful invasion of Canada during the War of 1812. The initial US ambassador to Mexico, Joel R. Poinsett, sought to obtain a favorable boundary settle ment while also hoping to encourage the spread of liberal values in Mexico. Alamán brought boundary negotiations to a standstill and, instead, pursued a policy of hispanoamericanista convencido in which he sought to integrate Spanish American nations within a permanent assembly to encourage friendship and trade in post-independence America. With this in mind, Alamán informed Poinsett that most favored trading privileges would be reserved for other Latin American countries rather than the United States. Alamán also resisted the construction of a Santa Fe road from St. Louis into New Mexico. To counteract US economic influence, Alamán became instrumental in encouraging the British to invest twelve million pesos into Mexican mines. The next US ambassador, Anthony Butler, thought he could bribe the astute and hostile Alamán but failed.
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With the establishment of the conservative regime of Antonio Bustamante in January 1830, Alamán once again occupied a key post, minister of internal and foreign affairs. Typically, he considered escaped slaves free from extradition to the United States. Determined to maintain order, Alamán repressed opposition, and the centralists intervened in state governments where liberal antagonists challenged the conservative regime in Mexico City. When independence-hero and former president Vincente Guerrero revolted in 1830, Bustamante-followers executed him. Although accused of giving the lethal order, Alamán was legally absolved of this charge a few years later.
An admirer of the Spanish imperial tradition, Alamán's program for government-sponsored industrialization had several nationalistic aspects. He proposed prohibitive tariffs on textile imports, stimulated colonization of under-populated regions, trained workers at govern- As revolts continued to plague Mexico, Alamán's conservatism became a hardened ideology. Fearing the loss of further territories, Alamán and Francisco Manuel Sánchez de Tagle -an important ideologue, poet, philosophy professor, and governor of the state of Mexicocreated the centralist 1830-Constitution, which established a supremo poder conservador to circumvent the constant revolts that had weakened Mexico since 1824. Alamán urged recognition of Texas's independence and proposed that Britain mediate the issue. Although Britain offered to guarantee protection of northern Mexico, Santa Anna backed off. After numerous federalist challenges, Santa Anna disbanded the 1836-Constitution to implant, in 1843, his conservative nationalist regime. 7 Alamán became a real estate broker from 1835 to 1837. As legal representative of the Duke of Terranova y Monteleone, the Italian owner of the Cortés estate, Alamán persuaded President Miguel Barragán to decree the restitution of these properties; but later Alamán had to sell most of it, with the exception of the sugar plantation of Atlacomulco, because of a liberal government's threat to expropriate them. analysis, Alamán overemphasized his condemnation of the violence which characterized the independence struggle. Alamán argued that the Hispanic legacy of centralized institutions, Catholicism, and colonial continuity was a significant part of the emerging Mexican nationality. In general, Alamán emphasized the historical unity of Mexico and Spain. In his Historia de Méjico, Alamán devoted only a short passage to the causes of the US-Mexican conflict and to the 1846-1848 war itself. He referred to these events by pointing out that Mexico had gone to war to resist usurpation. He characterized the struggle as "una guerra desgraciada". 9 The point in his life at which Alamán became a monarchist has been the subject of considerable speculation. It is possible that this occurred during Alamán's youthful travels in Europe. Alamán denied this, largely because he opposed the Holy Alliance powers that threatened Mexico's independence. Moreover, Alamán did not support the Iturbide monarchy, because its dynasty was too new to sink roots over such a considerable empire. It is probably more accurate to estimate the beginning of Alamán's interest in monarchy by 1832, when the first Bustamante regime fell. José María Gutiérrez de Estrada reintroduced the monarchist idea to the clergy and centralists after a liberal government confiscated Church property. Threatened by the United States, Alamán promoted a monarchy to create a strong conservative movement which would weld the nation together.
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A monarchist plot against the existing regime began to emerge from the Spanish ambassador in the autumn of 1845. Alamán and the Spanish diplomat Salvador Bermúdez de Castro agreed that a monarchy was essential to the preservation of order and military authority, the Church, and property holders. They both concluded that republicanism was ill-suited to Mexican traditions. As they began to draw in an ambitious army commander, Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga, the monarchist plot acquired strong possibilities. With the intention to weaken the regime of moderate leader José Joaquín Herrera, Alamán and his compatriots urged him to proclaim federalism, in order to hasten the government's collapse. Herrera's inability to make up his mind about the federalist proposal did succeed in raising doubts about the president's decisiveness. Paredes, meanwhile, agreed that if he were to seize power successfully, he would convoke an assembly in which conservatives would appeal to the Spanish Crown to name a monarch for Mexico.
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Spain channeled money to Paredes as rumors of the conspiracy spread throughout Mexico. The actual operation of the monarchist scheme remained secret, and Paredes made no mention of it when he proclaimed his rebellion on December 15, 1845. Although the opportunistic Paredes promised that a special congress would decide Mexico's future, he also modified his original proclamation so that the executive would uphold a republican state.
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Meanwhile, Alamán and fellow monarchists presented their case for a constitutional monarchy through the El Tiempo newspaper. While lamenting the loss of Texas and the independence of Yucatán, Alamán warned about the threat of war with the United States. The republic, he declared, had created nothing; it had destroyed everything. Mexico now had neither reputation, nor friends or allies because of its inability to govern itself. Through El Tiempo, Alamán proposed that the monarchical candidate be the infante Don Enrique, the brotherin-law of Isabella II, queen of Spain. Therefore, a European alliance would hopefully protect Mexico from the United States and secure its northern border. 13 Alamán eagerly assumed a leading role to consolidate his hopes for the establishment of a monarchy with the support of Paredes. Before war broke out with the United States, Paredes undoubtedly sought to establish a Mexican throne. Alamán served as his principal adviser; he drafted as well as announced a decree calling for elections for an extraordinary congress to select a form of government which would defend national security. Alamán and Bermúdez engineered the organization of a corporatist electoral system whereby 160 delegates would have represented nine different social classes, although the preponderance of power would be enjoyed by property owners, the Church, and the army.
14 By May 1846 Alamán enjoyed great influence and seemed to be on the verge of achieving his goals. The congress met and agreed upon a new constitution, approved by Alamán and Bermúdez. Paredes appointed Alamán as head of the Junta Superior de Hacienda, which resulted in fairly significant changes. Inspectors reorganized inefficient treasury agencies and began to introduce the metric system. 15 But the survival of the monarchist plot as well as the Paredes regime depended on the outcome of the impending conflict with the United States. President James K. Polk became upset at the thought of Mexico gaining a European ally. It is likely that Polk used the threat of a European monarchy in Mexico as the excuse for an eventually belligerent course of action. The Mexican military disasters at Palo Alto and Resaca de Palma in early May 1846 doomed the monarchists. Opposition newspapers soon galvanized public opinion against the whispered plot. The Paredes administration denied any connection to conspirators and the president embraced a republican framework in a futile attempt to retain authority. Alamán responded immediately by withdrawing his support from him, and the monarchist conspiracy ended abruptly. In congress, Alamán questioned the extent of Paredes's authority as chief executive and attempted to place the responsibility for the US declaration of war on him. 16 Alamán once more withdrew from active participation in political affairs and continued to oversee the estates of the Duke of Terranova. Nonetheless, he remained attuned to the political situation and provided lucid insights about the US-Mexican conflict. In addition to his dislike for the United States, Alamán believed that Mexico never should have become involved in a military engagement against the In his correspondence with the Duke of Terranova, Alamán revealed his despair about Mexico's internal disunity. After the "indecisive" battle between Taylor and Santa Anna at Buena Vista, Alamán noted that five battalions of the guardia nacional had revolted against Vice President Valentín Gómez Farías. With cannon fire thundering throughout Mexico City, death and enmity characterized the atmosphere. The fear of mobs particularly distressed Alamán. Moreover, the purchase of most goods could not be carried out, and wounded combatants often suffered without any medical attention. In such a sectarian situation, Alamán predicted correctly that the North Americans would probably capture the capital soon.
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By the end of May 1847, Alamán had become even more pessimistic. US forces had captured Puebla without much resistance. In Mexico City, personal and public circumstances became very painful. Confusion, robbery, and clashes with senior authorities became common. The newspapers mocked and ridiculed Santa Anna as defeats became commonplace on the battlefield. Concluding, Alamán feared that Mexico was going to be destroyed as an independent nation.
19
As General Winfield Scott slowly moved his force of ten or twelve thousand out of Puebla and toward Mexico City, Alamán marveled that a city of 180,000 with impressive fortifications and a "considerable garrison" would undoubtedly be defeated. The reason, according to Alamán, was that "the masses are not doing anything, they see the situation as if in a foreign country". Here, Alamán points out that the characteristic disunity of many Mexican regions extended to Mexico City: "In eight or ten days they will be in sight", Alamán mused while noting that little security existed as well as a total lack of confidence in the government. Alamán claimed that inside the capital few seemed to care if the North Americans seized the city or not. 20 Internal disunity, he insisted, was not the fault of the US invasion but rather that of incompetent Mexican authorities.
As July faded, Alamán noted other internal difficulties. One of them was the consistent demand for taxes throughout the Mexico City area. In addition to being sudden and arbitrary, the taxes which foreigners such as the Duke of Terranova had to pay were much higher than for Mexican citizens. Moreover, Alamán lamented the collapse of Mexico's international standing into ridicule while the prestige of the United States seemed to soar. 21 As Scott fought his way past General Gabriel Valencia, whom Santa Anna had not bothered to supply, Alamán watched the fighting from his country home near San Ángel. As Mexican fortifications fell into the hands of US soldiers, "everything was confusion and shameful disorder". Convinced that Santa Anna or the other Mexican generals could not win, Alamán sensed that the end of hostilities neared, but that the United States had no definite plans for Mexico after the cessation of hostilities.
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Things worsened as the US troops broke through Mexico City's defenses. Alamán and his family fled to Tlalnepantla as Santa Anna, in Alamán's view, blundered once again, turning an advantage at Chapultepec into another defeat. As Scott's troops burst into the suburbs, they seized Alamán's home, breaking down doors and destroying furniture as they mounted a cannon on its roof. It was a "scene of horror" because some of the city's civilians shot at US troops while thieves robbed homes and killings occurred in the streets. Few went out at night for fear of assassination, even after the occupation became thor-ough. Outside the capital, Alamán opined correctly that although US troops were not in complete control of Mexico -because of their limited quantity -, the Mexican army was not strong enough to resist the invasion. Alamán summarized the defeat by realizing that weak civilian and military leadership had been incapable of handling the US attack. 23 Because of Alamán's distinguished accomplishments and his management of the duke's Hospital de Jesús, US military officers treated him with great consideration. Scott's chief surgeon utilized the Hospital de Jesús for his wounded troops. Perhaps out of flattery for more assistance, the officers told Alamán that they had never seen such an excellent hospital. Alamán may have helped himself when he pointed out to these officers that the hospital enjoyed diplomatic protection from the Spanish government. 24 Three months later, Alamán reported that nothing unpleasant had occurred at the hospital despite the frequent visits of US military officers. Alamán impressed them greatly by showing off the ashes and portrait of Hernán Cortés inside the hospital. The Spanish conquistador had died exactly three centuries ago, and Alamán wondered how anyone could accept that the army of the young United States could suddenly occupy the majestic former colonial capital. 25 Alamán generally became morose about the US occupation. Not only had Polk officially withdrawn his peace negotiations in November, but US military commanders had been advised to confiscate Mexican money, and public as well as private properties. By doing so, Alamán believed, the US demonstrated its lack of respect for Mexico. Individual US soldiers continued to rob Mexican citizens, but Alamán noted happily that neither new taxes nor official ill-treatment had been handed down. Like many upper-class Mexicans, Alamán often contrasted the orderly nature of the occupation officials with the disorganization of Mexican rule, which he characterized as divided and full of mischief when the congress agreed to name General Pedro Anaya as interim president. Alamán considered Anaya a leader "of little capacity and no concept". "In such a way", Alamán groused, "six or seven presidents among interims and provisionals have come and gone within a year". Moreover, the various state governments had lapsed into confusion. 26 Alamán was a perceptive observer not only of difficulties within Mexico but also among the occupation forces. He noted that the US army suffered from "a thousand rivalries and hatreds" which soon resulted in court martial trials. Scott, Alamán noted, was at the center of such animosities. Despite frequent clashes between individual US soldiers and the Mexican masses, Alamán continued to enjoy friendly relations with North American officers who visited him frequently. He noted, without emotion, that US forces seized cities such as Toluca, Pachuca, and Cuernavaca without resistance. Alamán did not seem to care at this point, attributing such calamities to the "state of anarchy" which engulfed most of Mexico. 27 In this sense, Alamán himself is re pre sentative for the apathy of many upper-class Mexicans to US victory.
Like many Mexicans with property, Alamán feared the possibility of indigenous caste wars. Indians had begun attacking various estates near Cuernavaca with the intent of dividing and redistributing the land. Of course, Alamán had no toleration for such revolutionary acts even if intended as measures of social justice. As in other Mexican regions, the arrival of US troops which repulsed such attacks received strong approval from Alamán. Not surprisingly, Alamán feared that the departure of US troops would allow "revolutions of this nature to be repeated, leaving us with little security". Therefore, the reports of a peace treaty would "leave us in the state in which we have been enduring". 28 Alamán became very dejected when he learned the final terms of the peace treaty, although he understood that a US group advocating the conquest of all of Mexico loomed in the background. As early as February 1848, Alamán concluded that there would be a "considerable cession of territory" despite the determination of US expansionists who wanted to continue the war. Even after the treaty had been approved in the United States, Alamán was preoccupied about ratification in Mexico because of his natural distrust of the moderates who ruled. Unhappy with assaults, bandits, and collaborators working with the US army, Alamán concluded forlornly that "there is no hope whatsoever that things will improve in such circumstances". 29 Here, Alamán articulates the utter dismay and disunity that characterized Mexico when the war concluded.
A month later, in May 1848, Alamán lamented the disgraceful situation Mexico had fallen into, yet became apprehensive that US forces would soon depart. Internal upheavals continued because the moderates could not restore order. Class conflict on the level of civil war had left the white population in a precarious situation. Normally, Alamán concluded, the end of war would be a happy occasion, but not with internal conflicts blazing throughout the country. 30 Even the national government worried about the potential for disorder once US troops began to depart. Although Alamán did not understand the moderate liberal rulers in Mexico City sufficiently, they were actually as pessimistic about internal order as Alamán. 31 In that sense, the Mexican elite had little faith in its own people, be they conservatives, moderates, or liberals.
By June, Alamán's spirits had greatly improved. More "respectable" people had entered public service, with the result that General José Joaquín Herrera had been declared president by the congress. Although many feared that social revolution and new disturbances would result from the departure of US troops, Alamán finally sensed that "a little peace" would be more permanent. 32 As the war ended definitively with the withdrawal of US soldiers, Alamán became even more optimistic and assertive. Although plantation products such as coffee and sugar suffered very reduced prices as well as major difficulties in getting them to markets, Alamán was able to make debt payments on the duke's assets while promising him a remittance of a thousand pesos. Such calculations are corroborated by scholars who have researched the generally stable profits of nineteenth century landowners. 33 Moreover, Alamán predicted that the Mexican government would be obligated to repay 18,000 pesos that had been advanced from the estate earlier. Such a sum could be reasonably expected once the United States began paying Mexico the sums agreed upon in the peace treaty. 34 In 1848 Alamán's self-confidence returned rapidly as he reentered the political scene. More cautious than earlier, Alamán wrote for the new conservative outlet, El Universal, and minimized his monarchist inclinations. Alamán finally realized that a monarchical system could only be inaugurated with great difficulty. Since he was a realist, Alamán undoubtedly decided to attempt establishing a strong centralized government, utilizing the army and whatever conservative leader emerged. Alamán believed that the moderates could not remain in power very long, and he was correct.
In 1849 Alamán helped organize the Partido Conservador, which won elections held that year, so that Alamán became president of the Mexico City municipal government. Alamán insisted on providing education to the less privileged and sought to motivate landowners to become more involved in managing their haciendas. Alamán also established several public hygiene and safety reforms, improved jails by forcing prisoners to learn trades, and organized the municipal archi ves. Finally, Alamán restored order to the capital's treasury, budgeted increased funds for education, and introduced gas lighting. nomic policies. As one of Mexico's few statesmen who constantly warned his country of the dangerous ambitions that her northern neighbor harbored, Alamán voiced fairly accurate international predictions as well as candid domestic assessments.
